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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The election of Porfirio Lobos formally ended the crisis
created by the Honduran Supreme Court‘s decision to
remove democratically elected President José Manuel Zelaya
from office on June 28, 2009. Yet, profound consequences
from the decision persist. Honduras remains regionally
isolated, economically weak, and internally divided over the
applicability of the current constitution for resolving future
political predicaments. The crisis has contributed to the
entrenchment of opposing views, polarizing of society in an
unprecedented way, and the exacerbation of Hondurans‘
distrust in state institutions.
The opportunity for renewed instability remains the case for
Honduras, in part, due to the lack of sustained,
institutionalized democracy. As expressed succinctly by J.
Mark Ruhl: ―The outlook for democracy in Honduras is
uncertain.‖1 The current system is broken: calls for ―a new
Honduras‖ have been expressed from different sectors of
society, from government officials to grassroots
organizations. If a ―new‖ Honduras is to emerge, it must
provide a more competitive political and economic system

1

J. Mark Ruhl, ―Honduras Unravels,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21,
No. 2, April 2010, p. 94,
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0318_honduras_casaszamora.
aspx?p=1. Also, since 2004, Seligson and Booth had found that political
legitimacy was thin and that justification for a military coup in Honduras
was higher than in any other country in Latin America. See, Michael A.
Seligson and John A. Booth, ―Predicting Coups? Democratic
Vulnerabilities, the AmericansBarometer and the 2009 Honduran Crisis,‖
Latin American Public Opinion Project, “Insights” Series," 2009,
www.AmericasBarometer.org.

that guarantees all Hondurans tangible opportunities to
improve their wellbeing.
Honduras is at a crossroads. The unsettling episode of
President Zelaya‘s (forced) removal from office offers an
opportunity for inaugurating substantive change. The crisis
has had the effect of raising widespread social consciousness
and awareness of the importance of democratic values. It
has also galvanized new organizations to engage in national
political discourse, particularly by way of social media.
Failure of the State to take advantage of heightened
awareness, interest and participation by the mass populace
and to respond to Hondurans‘ long standing social demands
for inclusion and equality could lead, sooner or later, to the
rise of new messianic leaders seeking to profit from
Hondurans‘ distaste for ―politics as usual.‖
Restoring Honduras‘ social fabric requires building trust and
credibility in the State and its institutions. The government
of Honduras (GOH) needs to produce verifiable results that
directly and rapidly impact citizens‘ wellbeing. The State
could achieve this goal by implementing a short-term agenda
focusing on three key issues: promoting reconciliation,
fighting corruption, and improving citizens‘ security.
Obtaining some degree of positive results could help
Hondurans believe that positive change is possible, and thus
lay the groundwork for much needed long-term reforms. If
Honduras is to accomplish this task, it requires the support of
the international community.
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INTRODUCTION
Values, beliefs, traditions, customs, morals, law, and
institutions all help comprise the social fabric that binds a
nation together. Shared cultural components help create a
strong and cohesive society; pulled or broken threads stress
and/or tear at the social fabric. The constitutional crisis in
2009 created a significant amount of turmoil that stressed
Honduras‘ social fabric. One year later, Hondurans remain
anxious over how and when reconciliation will take full
effect.
The ouster of President José Manuel Zelaya sharply split
Honduran society. Families, friends, and colleagues took
sides with Golpistas (who supported Zelaya‘s removal) or
the Resistencia (who rejected it).
More importantly,
Hondurans who had opposed Zelaya‘s policies also wrestled
with the legality of the Supreme Court‘s and Armed Forces‘
decisions and actions, respectively. 2 These perceptions
pertaining to the legality of the ouster in turn influenced
Hondurans‘ acceptance or rejection of Roberto Micheletti‘s
transitional government and of the legitimacy of the
November 2009 election that brought Porfirio Lobo to office.
Despite the richness of the constitutional discussions that
followed, the events that set the election into motion startled

** Information for this paper is based primarily on interviews conducted
by the authors during field research to Tegucigalpa, Honduras in
February 2010. Substantial research was also conducted by Gina A.
Moreno, at ARC.
2
In surveys conducted by different organizations, between 46 and 60
percent of those surveyed opposed the way Zelaya was removed from
power. The Supreme Court acted at the request of the Attorney General,
and gave orders to the Armed Forces to arrest Zelaya. The arrest should
have been assigned to local/state police.
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Hondurans, especially the young, who for the past two
decades had witnessed peaceful transfers of power.3
The crisis produced other serious consequences. It
exacerbated Hondurans‘ lack of trust in already discredited
institutions. Economic activity came to a standstill as
protesters took to the street and international donors
suspended foreign assistance. Businesses were looted and
burned. Several people died during the violence. Strongarm law enforcement tactics against protesters led to several
allegations of human rights violations. Tension increased as
international mediation efforts failed, and Zelaya returned to
the country seeking diplomatic asylum at the Brazilian
embassy. For six months violence and fear dominated
everyday life for most Hondurans. While the immediate
crisis subsided after the new presidential election, the effects
of the conflict have persisted.4
This paper will thus briefly examine some of the key
stressors of the Honduran social fabric in light of the ouster,
such as polarization, lack of trust in institutions, corruption,
and lack of citizens‘ security. In sum, this paper contends
that Honduras is at a crossroads, and that the GOH has an
3

Honduras has a well-documented history of dictatorships. The transition
to democratic rule began in 1982.
4
See, J. Mark Ruhl, ―Honduras Unravels,‖ opp. Cit; and Alvaro Calix,
―Honduras: de la crisis política al surgimiento de un nuevo actor social,‖
Nueva Sociedad, No. 226, March-April 2010, www.nuso.org. See also,
an analysis of events prior to June 2009 in Ambassador Charles A. Ford
(retired), ―Re-setting our Engagement with Central America: Lessons
from the Honduran Crisis,‖ Perspectives on the Americas University of
Miami, Center for Hemispheric Policy, June 22, 2010; and Kevin CasasZamora, ―Next Steps for Honduras,‖ Testimony on the political crisis in
Honduras before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Brookings Institution, March 18,
2010.
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opportunity to implement serious reforms to alleviate the risk
of renewed instability.
A POLARIZED SOCIETY
Honduran society was on the path of polarization long before
the crisis that erupted in June 2009.
Zelaya was turning
more ideologically motivated than he seemed when elected
in 2005. The traditional elites rejected his call for a
Constitutional Assembly-- the now famous ―fourth ballot
box‖ --believing that Zelaya intended to change the law that
banned presidential reelection.
Also worrisome was
Zelaya‘s closeness to President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela
and fears that Honduras would follow the Venezuelan path.
With this fear, stopping Zelaya resonated well with many
Hondurans.
Others saw it differently, however. Shortly before his
removal, Zelaya enjoyed a 62 percent approval rating. 5 His
social policies, including the 60 percent increase in minimum
wages that had caused havoc on the economy, had benefited
the less-privileged sectors. These groups also welcomed his
decision to join the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
(ALBA) because it provided much-needed developmental
aid.6 The growing political gap turned into a war of words in
5

CIMA, ―Honduras,‖ Barómetro Iberoaméricano de Gobernabilidad
2009, www.cimaiberoamerica.com.
6
The Zelaya administration also received substantial assistance for
poverty reduction from the US and other donors. For example, the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a 5-year, US $205
million Compact Contract with Honduras to ―increase the productivity
and business skills of farmers and to reduce transportation costs between
targeted production centers and national, regional and global markets.‖
In September 2009, the MCC suspended two of the activities scheduled
under the Compact based on ―the undemocratic political activities of
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the media and fueled strong sentiments in favor or against
every decision made by the Zelaya Administration. The
class struggle was deepening by the time the crisis erupted.
By 2010, the Americas Barometer survey found that ―the
coup and its outcome appear to have opened a stark
difference between socioeconomic classes and their support
for democracy.‖7
Considering the growing political tension, the sharp split of
Honduran society in June 2009 was not unexpected.
Unanticipated perhaps was the extent and level of
segmentation that occurred. Extremism reigned among the
splintered groups, and ―the truth was lost in the process.‖ 8
There were no winners in the struggle; only losers.
The intensity of socio-political polarization in Honduras has
not diminished. The Honduran society is divided between
those that believe that the Constitution is still valid and those
that believe that it needs to be revised and reformed.9
Ironically, the call for a Constitutional Assembly that
triggered Zelaya‘s removal from office remains today a
critical barrier separating Hondurans.

June 2009.‖, but by March 2010, Honduras had received US$152.5
million of the allocated funds.
7
The findings suggest that the coup and its resolution decreased upper
class Hondurans‘ satisfaction with democracy, much more than for
poorer Hondurans. See: Orlando J. Pérez, John A. Booth and Mitchell A.
Seligson, ―The Honduran Catharsis,‖ An American Barometer Insights
Series Report, Americas Quarterly, August 2010,
http://www.americasquarterly.org/honduran-catharsis.
8
Interview with members of civil society organizations who asked to not
be identified. Tegucigalpa, February 2010.
9
―Comisión de la Verdad enfrenta enorme polarización: Stein,‖ La
Tribuna, Tegucigalpa, HN: May 19, 2010,
http://www.latribuna.hn/web2.0/?p=133627.
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LACK OF TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS
Hondurans‘ trust in institutions is among the lowest in Latin
America. Even prior to 2009, citizens had little respect for
Congress, Supreme Court, police, and Elections Tribunal.
They trusted local government more than the political
parties, which were at the bottom of the scale. Only the
institutional churches and international donors earned the
trust of large segments of the population. The media and the
Armed Forces also enjoyed significant levels of trust (see
below).
Most trusted institutions, 2009
Institution

Percentage

Catholic Church
Evangelical Church
International donor agencies
Media
Armed Forces
Human Rights Commissioner
Municipal governments
Institution Access Information
Supreme Court
Superior Court of Accounts
Superior Elections Tribunal
Labor unions
Police
Anti Corruption Attorney General
National Congress
Political Parties
Source: CNA, Informe Nacional de Transparencia, 2009
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38%
37.5
27.5
18.1
15.6
10.7
10.3
9.5
7.8
6.6
6.5
6.4
6.4
6.1
4.7
2.1

The 2009 events further undermined Hondurans‘ confidence
in their institutions. Zelaya‘s removal and replacement by
Roberto Micheletti as interim president involved decisions
by the Supreme Court, Congress, the Office of the Attorney
General, and the military, among others. For the majority
who opposed the ouster, it was precisely the decisions made
by these institutions and their compliance or non-compliance
with the constitution that raised the legality question and
further undermined trust in public institutions.
Of greater significance was the impact of the crisis on the
most trusted institutions. Unexpectedly, the trusted Catholic
Church took sides rather than assume the role of mediator to
the torn society. The highly respected Cardinal Oscar
Andrés Rodríguez asked President Zelaya during a live
broadcast in July not to return to the country, a call
interpreted as Church support for the interim government.10
In August, Cardinal Rodríguez explained that, ―If we look
back at what happened, we will discover the law was not
respected because the highest authority was the first to
violate it,‖11 again blaming Zelaya for his downfall.
Regardless of which side it took, the fact that the Church
took one side over the other significantly disappointed many
10

Radio Evangelización, ―Sacerdote hondureño condena posición del
Cardenal Rodríguez,‖ Radio Evangelización, 10 July 2009,
http://www.radioevangelizacion.org/spip.php?article3297. See also,
―Ecologics, La Postura Política de la Iglesia Católica en Honduras: el
Cardenal Óscar Andrés Rodríguez Madariaga,‖ 16 July 2010,
http://ecologics.wordpress.com/2009/07/12/la-postura-de-la-iglesiacatolica-en-honduras-el-cardenal-oscar-andres-rodriguez-maradiaga; and
Cardinal Rodríguez live broadcast at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMuZ94aFurM.
11
Catholic News Agency, ―Cardinal Rodriguez: ‗Church supports
reconciliation in Honduras‘,‖ Tegucigalpa, Honduras: 10 August 2009,
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/cardinal_rodriguez_church_s
upports_reconciliation_in_honduras/.
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Hondurans. It hurt one key element of Honduras social
fabric and raised doubts about the Church‘s role in postconflict efforts at reconciliation.
Similarly, there was despair over the role of the media during
the conflict.
The mass media, although owned and
controlled by a handful of wealthy families, had enjoyed a
high level of credibility. That the media supported Zelaya‘s
removal was expected given previous antagonisms between
the media and the Zelaya government. For the average
citizen, anguish came not from media support for the
―Golpistas,” but rather for failing to provide accurate,
objective, and timely information during the crisis.12 Again,
one of the trusted institutions led Hondurans down.
The Armed Forces, prior to the constitutional crisis was also
held in relatively high esteem by the population. At least 15
percent of the population viewed it as one of the most trusted
institutions (2009). Yet, only 27 percent of those surveyed
approved the Armed Forces‘ role in arresting and taking
Zelaya into exile, while 58 opposed it.13 The military had
been thrown back to a role that many Hondurans had hoped
was long gone.
The reaction of the international community, particularly the
US, also took many by surprise. The US‘s strong rejection
12

See, Leticia Salomón, ―El golpe de estado en Honduras: Antecedentes,
desarrollo y perspectivas. Notas para comprender lo que ha ocurrido y lo
que puede ocurrir,‖ Meeting with Honduran economist and sociologists
Leticia Salomon at Tulane University, Center for Inter-American Policy
and Research, October 19, 2009,
http://cipr.tulane.edu/home/events/19/meeting-with-Honduraneconomist-and-sociologist-leticia-salomon%C3%B3n.
13
Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2009, Santiago de Chile, CH,
Banco de Datos en Línea, www.latinobarometro.org.
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of the coup and calls for Zelaya‘s restoration surprised the
elites, particularly the entrepreneurs that had supported his
removal from office. Considering its history of close
relations with the US, they were angered by Washington‘s
reaction. In fact, the State Department revoked US visas for
19 top-ranking Hondurans, including the interim president
(Micheletti), the foreign minister, 14 Supreme Court justices
and several business people, among them Adolfo Facussé,
the head of the powerful National Association of Industries
(Asociación Nacional de Industrias—ANDI).14 Inexplicable
for these elites was watching the United States, Venezuela
and Cuba on the same side of the conflict calling for
President Zelaya‘s return to office.
CORRUPTION, CRIME, AND CITIZEN SECURITY
Hondurans‘ persistent lack of trust in public institutions
correlates with their perceptions of corruption in such
institutions.
In 2009, almost 80 percent of Hondurans
viewed politicians as the most corrupt followed by public
officials, police, and members of Congress, judges, and
ministers.
Hondurans identify corruption, along with
unemployment and citizen security, as their top three
concerns.15
Corruption in Honduras is endemic and systemic.
Corruption assessments conducted in country show that
corruption is rampant in Congress, the executive, the judicial
sector, the political parties, and the electoral process, as well
14

Honduras News, ―Adolfo Facussé Deported from US,‖ Honduras
News, 13 September 2009,
http://www.hondurasnews.com/2009/09/13/adolfo-facusse-deportedfrom-us/.
15
CIMA, opp. cit. p. 174.
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as in the delivery of services, security institutions and every
sector of society. 16 Excessive levels of discretion in the
handling of public funds, conflict of interests, and privatepublic sector collusion, influence peddling and much more
characterize corruption in most institutions. More notably,
there exist no functional systems of checks and balances or
oversight to regulate, prevent, control, and prosecute
corruption.
Corruption is inevitably linked to illicit trafficking. The
State Department reports that ―official corruption continues
to be an impediment to effective law enforcement and there
are press reports of drug trafficking and associated criminal
activity among current and former government and military
officials.‖17 A recent study has found that security costs and
losses due to crime absorbed nearly 10 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP).18
Drug trafficking and corruption, particularly as it discredits
authority and tolerates impunity, translates into crime and
violence, which further discredits the institutions in question.
The GOH is failing to provide safety for its citizens. The US
State Department reports that crime is endemic in Honduras;
poverty, gangs, and low apprehension and conviction rates of
criminals contribute to a significant crime rate, including acts
16

The authors have conducted corruption assessments in Honduras in the
past. The same conclusions have been reached by the CNA.
17
US State Department, ―2009 INCSR: Country Reports – Honduras
through Mexico,‖ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (INCSR), Washington, DC: February 27, 2009,
www.state.gov/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/vol 1/116522.htm.
18
Quoted in: USAID, Audit of the USAID/Honduras Democracy and
Governance Program, San Salvador, ES: Office of the Inspector
General, Audit Report No. 1-522-09-009-P, June 4, 2009, p. 3.
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of mass murder. Kidnappings are increasing and ―express
kidnapping‖—affecting common individuals—is on the
rise.19 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
reported in 2008 that, with a population of approximately 7.3
million people, Honduras has one of the world‘s highest per
capita murder rates.20 The conflicts within the police itself
and between police and Armed Forces over drug
enforcement and interdiction issues reflect a conflict between
cartels, which also has the potential to escalate.
Unemployment is also linked to crime and corruption. The
increasing unemployment rate, the greater number of youths
there are available in the streets with the potential to join
drug trafficking gangs.
Unemployment
increased
dramatically after President Zelaya authorized the sixty
percent increase in salaries, which small business could not
sustain. The global economic crisis contributed to the
economic dislocation caused by the political crisis. Many
young people in remote municipalities are being trained by
the cartels as boat operators, truck drivers, as well as other
jobs that help with drug smuggling. Deportation of
Hondurans who have committed crimes in the US (and often
have been incarcerated) fuels not only increased
unemployment but crime and insecurity as well.21
DEEDS NEEDED
President Porfirio Lobo came into office with 56 percent of
the popular vote. The high approval rating suggested that the
19

US State Department, opp. Cit.
US State Department, ―Honduras: Country Specific Information,‖ at
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1135.html.
21
Honduras Weekly, ―Deportations of Hondurans down by 17%,‖
December 26, 2009. http://hondurasweekly.com/national/2023deportations-of-hondurans-from-us-declining.
20
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majority of the population accepted the election as
legitimate. His campaign team drafted a low-key campaign
promising reconciliation and unity in response to growing
demands for clear and honest signals of restoring legitimacy
and achieving reconciliation.22 President Lobo also faces the
development challenges that traditionally have plagued
Honduras and that are the basis for the high levels of socioeconomic underdevelopment.
Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Central America,
whether poverty is measured against the local poverty line
(51 percent, the second highest in the region), the $2/day
poverty line (35 percent, the highest in the region), or the
$1.25/day extreme poverty line (22 percent, the highest in
the region). Social indicators are low, with male/female life
expectancy at birth at 66 and 73 years, respectively, the
lowest in the Central American region. The second highest
percentage of the population in the region not using an
improved water source is Honduras. 23
During his first six months in office, the Lobo administration
emphasized mending fences abroad. Restoring relations
with neighbors became a priority, as well as lobbying for a
return to the Organization of American States (OAS), which
suspended Honduras in June 2009 for President Zelaya‘s
22

Lobo‘s campaign manager was the well-know political strategist Juan
José Rendón. See, MegaTV, María Elvira Salazar‘s interview with J.J.
Rendón in Bogotá, Colombia, broadcast in Miami on 5 July 2010. See
also, PRNewswires, ―Political Mastermind and Strategist JJ Rendon
Once Again the Driving Force Behind Juan Manuel, Forbes.com, 22
June 2010,
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/prnewswire/2010/06/22/prnewswire201006
221552 PR_NEWS_USPR_____DC24965.html.
23
USAID, Audit of the USAID/Honduras Democracy and Governance
Program, opp. Cit., p. 3.
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ouster. At home, attention focused on revitalizing the
economy and recovering from the loss of international
assistance and foreign investment. Regarding development
programs, Lobo adopted the Visión de País 2010-2038 (A
Country Vision 2010-2038), a 38- year development plan,
and a Plan de Nación 2010-2022 (The Nation‘s Plan 20102022), a strategy for its implementation over the next 12
years.24
The Vision and Nation plans will serve as the government‘s
development blueprint for the next seven administrations.
Drafted mostly by the Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa
Privada--COHEP (Honduras‘ Private Sector Council), the
Plans incorporate several previous plans—including one
drafted under the Zelaya administration. A careful review of
the two plans indicates that they are overly ambitious, do not
focus on resolving immediate concerns, and have unrealistic
timeframes.25
Also in process is the implementation of the San José and
Tegucigalpa Accords signed in July and October 2009 by
Micheletti and Zelaya negotiators. The accords called for the
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Named by the Organization of American States in May
2010, the Commission (Comision de la Verdad y
Reconciliación-CVR), is headed by Eduardo Stein, former
vice president of Guatemala. The CVR hopes to contribute to
―the clarification for some of the most delicate and stringent
issues surrounding the events of June 28 [2009]… to provide
those sectors of Honduran society that have antagonistic

24

República de Honduras, Visión de País 2010-2018 y Plan de Nación
2010-2022, January 2010.
25
Ibid.
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views an opportunity to express their own experiences and
what they went through.‖26
The CVR is distrusted by both ―golpista‖ and ―resistencia”
sectors. Stein explains that, ―on the far right they consider
[the Commission] a Trojan horse that will promote
constitutional reform and among the Zelayistas and the
resistance, they see us just as an extension of the coup, only
window-dressing.‖27 Still, Stein is an optimist, and expects
the Honduran leadership to agree, as happened in Guatemala
and El Salvador during the peace agreement, to look ahead
and work jointly for the future of Honduras.
The new social groups that emerged during the crisis and
remain active have identified investigation of human rights
violations as essential to a reconciliation process. The CVR
has agreed to collect the testimony of victims and also look
at the allegations of human rights violations reported by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
These include human rights abuses continued under the Lobo
administration. According to the IACHR, several people
have been murdered, including journalists and human rights
defenders, and there is an ―absence of effective
investigations that could lead to clarification of these
events.‖28 The IACHR has also reported on threats and
26

Tracy Wilkinson, ―Q&A: Guatemalan seeks answers in Honduran
coup,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/09/world/la-fg-honduras-stein-qa20100510; and Luis Alonso Lugo, ―OEA define a integrantes de la
comisión sobre Honduras,‖ Associated Press (AP), Washington, 17 May
2010, http://www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/2010/06/17/internacionales/28123.
27
Tracy Wilkinson, opp. Cit.
28
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ―IACHR concerned
about human rights violations in Honduras,‖ Press Release No. 54/10,
Tegucigalpa, Honduras: May 19, 2010.
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harassment received by human rights defenders, journalists,
communicators, teachers, and members of the resistance. Of
particular concern to the Commission was the continuation
of impunity for human rights violations and the ―acts of
harassment directed against judges‖ who opposed the ouster.
Reconciliation and the restoration of the social fabric will
require more than implementing the CVR recommendations.
The GOH must be attentive to citizens‘ sensitivities and
concerns.
Some decisions have antagonized both
―golpistas” and the ―resistencia.‖ For example, resistencia
groups have been demanding accountability from those
involved in the coup and instead, General Romeo Vázquez
Velázquez, former head of the Honduran Armed Forces who
led Zelaya‘s removal, was appointed to head the state-owned
telecommunications company, HONDUTEL- a position
often associated with opportunities for corruption-- leaving
unanswered demands for justice. Similarly, the president‘s
trip to South Africa during the 2010 World Cup to support
the Honduran team seemed reasonable, but taking along
almost 100 government officials and not transferring
authority to anyone before leaving was seen as irresponsible
and out of touch with the people‘s hardship and anxieties.29
The failure to curb corruption, as well as the increase in drug
trafficking, places Honduras on high risk of state capture by
criminal interests. Repeated administrations in Honduras
have promised to fight corruption but often lack the political
will to do so.
The Zelaya and Micheletti governments
seemed to be no exception. In fact, the once credible
National Anticorruption Council (Consejo Nacional
29

―Honduras sin gobierno ni autoridades: Lobo, su familia y sus
funcionarios se fueron ayer para Sudáfrica,” Aporrea.org, 13 June 2010,
http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n159253.html.
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Anticorrupción—CAN) has practically collapsed.30 Under
the current administration, conflict of interests and nepotism
continue unabated. Powerful entrepreneurs who have been
appointed to the cabinet continue running their private
businesses and several of the president‘s family members
occupy government positions.31
To address the third key stressor, crime and insecurity, the
new GOH named Oscar Alvarez as Security Minister.
Alvarez had a solid reputation for fighting crime under the
Maduro administration. Shortly after his new appointment,
he ordered rapid interventions in key neighborhoods, often
confiscating large caches of weapons.32 The impact of these
operations will require some time to show results. In the
meantime, President Lobo‘s popular support dropped ten
percent precisely because citizens fail to see tangible results
from these offensives.33
30

The twelve civil society organizations that make up the Council took
different sides during the crisis, weakening its cohesion. In October
2009, the head of CNA was openly in support of the coup and hurt the
institution‘s credibility. Also, the Catholic Church removed its
representatives in disagreement with the running of the institution in
March 2010.
31
President Lobo‘s son, Jorge Dimitrio Lobo, was named governor of
Olacho, Honduras‘ largest department. His daughter Tania is the country
representative at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.
His nephew Francisco Quesada Lobo is the Director of the Honduran
Consulate in New York. The First Lady is the Coordinator of the
Education for All Plan at the Ministry of Education.
32
Televisa, ―Honduras declara guerra a la delincuencia,‖ Noticiero
Televisa, January 28, 2010,
http://www2.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/internacional/america/133993/
honduras-declara-guerra-delincuencia.
33
―Cae popularidad del presidente de Honduras por problemas de
seguridad ciudadana,‖ América Economía, 1 June 2010,
http://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/politica/caepopularidad-del-presidente-de-honduras-por-problemas-de-seguridad-ciu.

17

THE ROAD AHEAD
Honduras faces many more challenges than those outlined
here, both internally and externally. Perhaps none is more
significant than the frustration of large segments of the
population with ―politics as usual.‖ The polarization, distrust
in the institutions, corruption, unemployment, crime and
citizens insecurity, severe income inequalities, and growing
hardships are elements that may lead to protests, particularly
after the 2009 experience with taking to the streets to
denounce the coup. Hondurans need reassurances that the
democratic path is the right one. Failure to do so may
provide opportunities for populist leaders to grow on fertile
ground.
There is consensus among observers that the Honduran
government must provide tangible results. For J. Marc Ruhl,
for example, ―if the new chief executive simply pays no
more than lip service to the need to attack poverty and
inequality and to the importance of punishing the corrupt,
popular support for democratic politics will likely resume its
decline.‖34
Similarly, the Honduran Human Rights
Commissioner has stated that, ―each day, the Honduran
people feel more discontent, more unsatisfied and more
anxious over demands for good health and education
services.‖35
The GOH has the opportunity to offer immediate relief to its
citizens. It could design and implement a brief agenda that
34

J. Mark Ruhl, opp. cit., p. 106.
―Hay toda una burocracia montada a favor de la corrupción,‖ interview
with the Human Rights Commissioner, June 21, 2010,
http://www.conadeh.hn/Joomla/index.php/component/content/article/114
-hay-toda-una-burocracia-montada-a-favor-de-la-corrupcion.
35
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brings about verifiable results within a short period of time.
The primary objective should be to restore the social fabric
by creating trust and credibility. Such an agenda could focus
on three issues:
promoting reconciliation, fighting
corruption, and improving citizens‘ security. Hondurans
need rapid results in order to believe that change is possible,
and thus be prepared to await much needed longer- term
reforms. Some initiatives that could produce results in the
short term are:
Reconciliation: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
is an important first step. It needs to be inclusive and
respond to the questions lingering in people‘s minds. The
final report should be disseminated broadly and without
delay. This would provide citizens a sense that the Lobo
administration and the Commission are transparent and
accountable. The GOH should be readily prepared to
implement the Commission‘s recommendations.
Fighting Corruption: The GOH must provide clear
indications that it is committed to preventing and fighting
corruption. Honduras has had some successful experiences
in fighting corruption in the past. The mechanisms created to
verify the use of Hurricane Mitch reconstruction funds, for
example, were reliable and effective and included civil
society participation. Similarly, the National Anticorruption
Council had gained a solid reputation; the government has
drafted an Anticorruption Plan and some basic anticorruption
laws have been enacted, including the Law on Transparency
and Access to Information. Reform of the judicial sector
had also gained some momentum with the support of the US.
Honduras requires broad, comprehensive anticorruption
reform to fend off the capture of the state by drug trafficking
organizations. It needs to revamp the judicial and financial
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sectors, restructure oversight institutions, and reform entities
in charge of law enforcement.36 These reforms are muchneeded long-term goals. In the short term, the Lobo
administration, with the assistance of the international
community, could take decisive steps that show political will
to fight corruption. Among them:









Restore credibility of the National Anticorruption
Commission. It should be an independent entity with
sufficient authority and resources to carry out
initiatives to prevent and investigate corruption.
Demand asset declarations from cabinet members.
This is a requirement of the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption that Honduras has
signed. Ministers should place businesses in blind
trust while serving as government officials.
Drastically reduce corruption in customer services.
The procedure to obtain licenses/permits or for
paying fines/services, for example, can rapidly
become efficient and transparent, helping build
citizens trust in their institutions.
Revamp the Electoral Tribunal to generate
confidence in elections.
Initiate reform of the Supreme Court of Justice and
take the necessary measures to reduce impunity.

36

USG will provide significant support in the coming year under the
Merida Initiative. It will fund a variety of programs that will strengthen
the institutional capabilities of participating governments by supporting
efforts to investigate, sanction, and prevent corruption within law
enforcement agencies; facilitating the transfer of critical law enforcement
investigative information within and between regional governments; and
funding equipment purchases, training, community policing, and
economic and social development programs.
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Allocate the required budget to municipalities to
ensure that the decentralization process moves
forward. The Americas Barometer surveys indicates
that making resources available to improve the
performance of local government and local civil
society might pay off with a ―rebound‖ in those
attributes of a political culture supportive of
democratic institutions. In Honduras, all politics is
local.

The international community, particularly the US, could
assist the GOH in carrying out these tasks. Since 2008,
USAID reduced funding to Honduras‘ governance programs
due to budget constraints. Yet, the Office of Inspector
General has recommended that USAID/Honduras continue
with the democracy and governance programs, which have
had a significant impact on the judicial sector, and to provide
funding for programs that would contribute to improving the
quality of governance. Moreover, USAID could initiate
specific anticorruption programs, particularly since
Honduras was not included in the USAID Central American
and Mexico Transparency and Governance Programs (CAMTAG). Honduras needs assistance in fighting corruption and
it needs it now.
Citizens Security:
Revamping security and law
enforcement institutions is an urgent matter, but not one that
will provide immediate and visible results for the population.
Yet, rapid and effective measures could be implemented to
reduce opportunities for violence in local communities.
Honduras already has experience with programs to address
emergency situations. In 1998, after Hurricane Mitch
created a humanitarian crisis, the international community
responded in kind. The State Department‘s Office of
Transition Initiatives provided substantial rapid respond
21

assistance to thousands of homeless people. Mechanisms
were implemented to ensure transparency and accountability
in the handling of assistance funds.
While having a rapid impact on reducing drug trafficking in
Central America seems to be elusive, there is plenty of room
to improve Honduras‘ judicial system. In recent years, US
democracy and governance assistance to Honduras has
helped increase the efficiency of criminal court procedure,
and helped strengthen the formal legal framework for the
justice system and citizen access to government information.
These programs should be reinstituted and strengthened.
Assistance could be provided for creating youth employment
in high risk areas, community support for victims of crime,
particularly women, and promoting citizens‘ involvement in
taking back their neighborhoods. Honduras has several rapid
intervention initiatives already on the ground that could be
strengthened and expanded.
CONCLUSION
The Honduran crisis of 2009 has exacerbated societal
cleavages and created a demand for profound change. The
crisis may also provide the opportunity to seize the moment
to transform Honduran society through democratic
mechanisms. Failure to do so will leave the door open for
populist politicians to promise change, most likely through
non-democratic means. Honduras also runs the risk of
becoming a failed state subject to the interests of drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) if corruption, inequality,
social injustice, impunity, and disregard for the plight of the
majority of the population continue unabated.
Honduras has been a privileged recipient of international aid
for several decades. With that support, it has made strides in
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the transition toward democracy, removed the Armed Forces
from politics, provided space for citizens to participate and
organize themselves, particularly at the local level, and has
attempted to reform the judicial system.
It now needs
profound reforms that will lead to global integration,
economic growth, and social justice. Charles A. Ford,
former ambassador to Honduras, has called on the
international community to seize this moment ―with the
same urgency and conviction with which it responded‖ to the
crisis following Hurricane Mitch or the current crisis in Haiti
after the January 2010 earthquake.37 There are opportunities
to initiate rapid response initiatives to empower Hondurans
to embark on the difficult tasks of gaining trust among
themselves and in their institutions. Maintaining ―politics as
usual‖ does not augur well for the nation‘s future.

37

Ambassador Charles A. Ford, retired, ―Re-setting our Engagement
with Central America …‖ opp. cit., pp. 6.
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